Mali's Tuareg Rebels
April 6, 2012 | 1608 GMT
Read more: Mali's Tuareg Rebels | Stratfor
Analysis
The National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), one of the Tuareg rebel groups in Mali that has forcibly taken control of the country's northeast, has announced a cease-fire. A spokesman for the group said it had reached the boundary of the traditional Tuareg homeland, known as Azawad, stopping just short of the central town of Mopti after having seized Gao and Timbuktu on March 31 and April 1. The MNLA will not continue its offensive southeast toward the capital of Bamako, according to the spokesman. Fighting against the Tuaregs was one of the main reasons cited by those who participated in the March 21 coup. The ensuing confusion presented an opportunity to the Tuaregs. With the army splintered -- some soldiers were fighting Tuaregs, some displacing government officials in Bamako and others deserting their ranks -- the MNLA was able to launch a strategic offensive and quickly assume control of key cities against minimal military opposition. Control of these cities, particularly Gao and Timbuktu, awards the Tuaregs control of northern Mali entirely -- and with that control, time to consolidate power and entrench themselves in the region. Given the apparent ruinous state of the military, dislodging the Tuaregs appears to be extremely difficult in the near term, particularly without third-party assistance. But foreign intervention seems highly unlikely; the removal of the junta or the establishment of a legitimate government capable of leading an offensive against the Tuaregs would make intervention possible, but not inevitable. As a result, Tuareg control of the northeast will endure for the foreseeable future as long as the current circumstances persist.
The National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), one of the Tuareg rebel groups in Mali that has forcibly taken control of the country's northeast, has announced a cease-fire. A spokesman for the group said it had reached the boundary of the traditional Tuareg homeland, known as Azawad, stopping just short of the central town of Mopti after having seized Gao and Timbuktu on March 31 and April 1. The MNLA will not continue its offensive southeast toward the capital of Bamako, according to the spokesman.
Fighting against the Tuaregs was one of the main reasons cited by those who participated in the March 21 coup. The ensuing confusion presented an opportunity to the Tuaregs. With the army splintered -- some soldiers were fighting Tuaregs, some displacing government officials in Bamako and others deserting their ranks -- the MNLA was able to launch a strategic offensive and quickly assume control of key cities against minimal military opposition. Control of these cities, particularly Gao and Timbuktu, awards the Tuaregs control of northern Mali entirely -- and with that control, time to consolidate power and entrench themselves in the region.
Given the apparent ruinous state of the military, dislodging the Tuaregs appears to be extremely difficult in the near term, particularly without third-party assistance. But foreign intervention seems highly unlikely; the removal of the junta or the establishment of a legitimate government capable of leading an offensive against the Tuaregs would make intervention possible, but not inevitable. As such, Tuareg control of the northeast will endure for the foreseeable future as long as the current circumstances persist.
Analysis
Understanding the Malian geography is central to understanding why the Tuaregs' control of the northeast will endure.
Distinct Geographies
Mali can be thought of as composed of two, roughly triangular sections. The larger section comprises the country's northeast, while another smaller section, affixed perpendicularly to the base of the larger section's southwest corner, comprises the remainder of the country. Wide on the ends and narrow in the middle, the country vaguely resembles a tilted hourglass.
Geographically, the two sections differ markedly. Flat, open desert dominates the northeast while the southwest contains several rivers and rolling vegetated plains. Simply put, the divide between the two triangles represents the divide between the Saharan desert and plains of the Sahel. This partly explains why the northeast historically has been populated by semi-nomadic peoples while sedentary populations flourished in the southwest. The Malian capital of Bamako is located in the southwestern core, roughly 1,200 kilometers (750 miles) away from the Tuareg core in the Hoggar Mountains, which straddle the Mali-Algeria border.
The Niger River runs northeast to where the borders narrow in the center of Mali, bifurcating the country diagonally before turning to the southeast. Only a few routes connect northeastern Mali to southwestern Mali. The country's main paved road runs eastward and crosses the Niger River over a bridge at Gao while the westernmost routes meander through wetlands or stop at a ferry crossing in Niafunke before continuing to Timbuktu. In other words, while the Niger River does not perfectly bisect Mali at its narrowest point, the river, along with a lack of serviceable roads, creates a natural barrier through which it is difficult to move troops.
The rainy season in Mali will begin soon, restricting travel to the one road that is serviceable year-round. (Another road circumvents the Niger River into Timbuktu, but as a seasonal road, it will not be passable until after the rainy season.) Such restriction gives the Tuaregs a tactical advantage against any counterattack -- there is only one avenue of approach. Any attempt by the Malian military to launch a counteroffensive has been made extremely difficult by the Tuareg's taking Timbuktu and Gao.
Military Constraints
After the coup, the Tuaregs helped themselves by positioning their forces in key locations. Meanwhile, the Malian military -- already an unimpressive force of 7,000 troops with negligible armor, fixed wing aircraft and rotary wing aircraft -- fell further into disarray. Desertions, a problem even before the coup, continue and soldiers appear to be retreating with or without order to do so. According to media reports from April 3, many of those that are retreating are doing so independently of their units. The military undoubtedly lost munitions and equipment left behind in bases as soldiers retreated. Indeed, videos from Gao show several combat reconnaissance patrol vehicles, armored personnel carriers and weapons captured by the rebels.
Moreover, as a result of either the coup or the Tuaregs' control, supply lines to the northeast likely have been severed. Any troops will be unable to sustain a protracted fight. In addition, what minimal air support was once available has ceased, so any superior firepower the military had is now irrelevant.
The coup has eliminated cohesive leadership in Bamako and left the government paralyzed. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has imposed sanctions on the military junta, and the United States has also suspended aid. Combined with a fracturing military and the Tuaregs' geographically advantaged position, Mali cannot regain territory it lost to the rebels without foreign assistance.
There are, however, two options that may benefit Mali. ECOWAS has discussed "activating" a standby force under the right conditions, and France, which has refused to intervene militarily, has said it would provide logistical support for ECOWAS intervention. This remains a remote possibility. ECOWAS has no standing regional force, however, and would need to mobilize contributions from West African member states. ECOWAS would intervene if the Tuaregs were able to advance into the southwestern core and threaten Bamako. No West African government would permit sub-national groups in their own countries to become emboldened by Tuareg successes and threaten their own territorial integrity and political control.
There are also signs that the Tuaregs are starting to fracture. The most prominent group, the MNLA, claims no association to Islamic militancy and instead appeals to the Tuareg legacy in the desert. Another group fighting alongside MNLA known as Ansar Dine holds different beliefs; members call for the application of Sharia throughout the country. A third group called Tawhid and Jihad has emerged, and its stated goal is to rid Mali of what it considers "symbols of oppression." They also claim to be transnational jihadists comprising fighters from Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Mauritania.
Fissures among these groups have yet to cause serious problems for the Tuaregs, but such fissures would certainly benefit the Malian military. (These fissures could easily be exploited with the Tuaregs' expanded room for maneuver.) Absent these divisions, or the off chance of foreign military intervention, the Malian army will be unable to dislodge the Tuaregs.
Read more: Mali: Military Unlikely to Dislodge Tuareg Rebels | Stratfor
(Fuente: Stratfor)
